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Abstract 
 
Using two alternative indicators of redistribution -social transfers and social spending- 
over the time-period 1880-1933 and using two alternative proxies for inequality -the 
percentage of non-family farms and the top income shares-, this paper shows that, 
contrary to what many studies on the origins of the welfare state appear to implicitly 
suggest, inequality did not favour the development of social policy even in its early 
stages. Since social policy developed more easily in countries that were previously more 
egalitarian, it seems that unequal societies were in a sort of inequality trap, where 
inequality itself was an obstacle to redistribution. 
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Resumen 
 
Utilizando dos indicadores alternativos de redistribución –las transferencias sociales y 
el gasto social- durante el periodo de tiempo comprendido entre 1880 y 1933, y 
utilizando dos indicadores alternativos de desigualdad –el porcentaje de explotaciones 
agrarias no familiares y los top income shares-, este papel muestra que, al contrario de 
lo que muchos estudios sobre los origines del Estado del Bienestar suelen sugerir, la 
desigualdad no favoreció el desarrollo de la política social ni siquiera en sus etapas 
iniciales. Ello significa que la política social se desarrolló más rápidamente en los países 
que previamente ya eran más igualitarios, lo que sugiere que los países con más 
desigualdad se encontraban en una especie de trampa de la desigualdad, donde la 
desigualdad en si misma fue uno de los obstáculos a la redistribución. 
 
Palabras clave: política social, desigualdad, redistribución, historia económica 
comparada 
Códigos JEL: H50, D63, N30. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the early studies about the origins of modern social policy, “the welfare state 
[was] seen as an erratic and pragmatic response” to the problems brought about by 
industrialization (Fraser ([1973]2003, p. 1). In that sense, constant references we find 
in that literature to the harsh conditions of life of the new industrial workers, the 
unhealthy environment of the cities, industrial unemployment or child labour, all this 
within a context of unprecedented economic growth, seem to suggest that 
(industrialization-led) inequality was one of those problems which had to be solved. 
Indeed, explicit references to inequality are often found in studies about the origins of 
modern social policy. Flora and Heidenheimer (1981), for example, say that equality 
along with socioeconomic security “are interpreted as the core of the welfare state” (p. 
9). 
 
The relationship between inequality and redistribution in current days has also 
been largely studied. There is no consensus, however, on the role of inequality. While 
the median voter theories maintain that redistribution increases with inequality 
(Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994), 
recent papers point in the opposite direction and conclude that inequality has a 
negative impact on redistribution (Bénabou, 2000, 2004; Lindert, 2004; Barth and 
Monee, 2009). However, despite the more or less implicit references to inequality we 
find in the literature of the origins of the welfare state, there are no comparative and 
quantitative studies focusing specifically on the role played by inequality during the 
early stages of modern social policy. The aim of this paper is to help filling in this gap 
by analysing econometrically the impact of inequality on the evolution of social policy 
in a sample of advanced countries over the time-period 1880-1933. This may in turn 
contribute to today's debates about the relationship between inequality and 
redistribution. 
 
Analysing this time-period has also several advantages. Differences in social 
spending levels over those years were quite large, possibly larger than today. For 
example, in 1930, social spending (as a percentage of GDP) in Germany was 10 times 
greater than in Spain and 8 times higher than in Italy. As for inequality, differences 
were also noticeable. Our sample includes countries such as Spain, Italy and Portugal 
with high levels of inequality, and others, such as Norway or Denmark, which were 
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much more egalitarian.1 Analysing this time-period has also certain advantages when 
dealing with the problem of endogeneity in the relationship between inequality and 
redistribution. In studies on present economies, one possible way to avoid this 
endogeneity problem is using pre-tax inequality indicators but, still, the possibility that 
current inequality (even before taxes) is not related to redistributive policies applied in 
previous years cannot be completely ruled out. Between 1880 and 1930, however, social 
policy was still in its infancy, so it is reasonable to think that inequality was still an 
exogenous variable (or at least much more exogenous than it is nowadays). 
 
As a dependent variable of my analysis, I have used the series of social transfers 
estimated by Lindert, which cover the time-period 1880-1930 and are available for 
more than 20 countries. The main limitation of those social transfers data is that they 
only include tax-funded public social spending but not social insurance provisions.2 
This may restrict the analysis somewhat, at least in the case of many European 
countries where the rise of modern social policy was clearly linked to social insurance. 
For that reason I have made a new estimation of social spending in 1930 and 1933 for 
22 countries, which do include social insurances’ benefits. This is based on information 
coming from the surveys of social services published by the International Labour Office 
in the 1930s, except in the cases of Portugal, where the figures are from Valerio (2001), 
and Spain, which have been estimated by myself from public budget sources and the 
statistics of the Spanish National Institute of Social Insurance. Finally, as well as the 
aggregate volume of social spending, I have analysed the influence of inequality on the 
different social programmes (pensions, health, welfare, etc.), for both Lindert’s social 
transfers and my social spending data. This has enabled a more detailed analysis. For 
example, the econometric outcomes suggest that, during the time-period under study, 
autocratic governments prioritized spending on traditional welfare, while democratic 
governments leant towards more modern-style programmes, such as health spending. 
 
Our results indicate that inequality had a negative impact on both social 
transfers and my new estimation of social spending. This applies for both democratic 
and non-democratic countries. However, it seems that the negative effect of inequality 
was smaller in democracies. In other words, egalitarian democracies tended to 
redistribute more, not less, than unequal democracies, and the same can be said of the 
autocratic governments: redistribution was greater where there was less inequality. 
                                                 
1 More detailed information on the definition of social spending and inequality can be found in the 
following sections. 
2 Social insurances were funded via employers’ and workers’ contributions (the so-called social 
contributions) plus public subsidies. Lindert includes these public subsidies (plus other government social 
expenditures) but not the final benefits paid by social insurances. 
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However, under the same level of inequality, democratic countries appear to have been 
more sensitive to demands for redistribution than dictatorships. It could therefore be 
said that unequal countries found themselves in a kind of inequality trap, since high 
levels of inequality were reinforced by ungenerous redistributive policies. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes some of the 
main theories on the relationship between inequality and redistribution. In Section 3 
we present our new estimation of social spending and compare it with Lindert's series 
of social transfers. Sections 4 and 5 analyse the impact of inequality on social transfers 
and social spending, respectively. Section 6 looks at possible implications of our results 
for the evolution of the political regime. From Boix (2003) and Engerman and Sokoloff 
(2002, 2005) one can derive that inequality hampers the stability of democracy. The 
mechanism is straightforward. In these models redistribution is assumed to increase 
with inequality under democracies. Therefore, if inequality is very high, the social elites 
will support non-democratic governments to avoid redistribution. In Section 6 we 
show, however, that we do not need redistribution to increase with inequality for 
economic elites to have incentives to support autocratic governments. We just need 
that, for a given level of inequality, democracies are more redistributive than 
dictatorships. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Theories on inequality and redistribution 
 
According to the median voter models, redistribution increases with inequality. 
If the median voter income is below the mean income (i.e. under high inequality levels) 
then a majority of voters (all those whose income is less than the mean) will support 
redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and 
Tabellini, 1994). However, the empirical evidence suggests that inequality does not 
always give rise to more redistribution (Perotti, 1994, 1996; and Alesina et al., 2001). 
To explain this, Roemer (1998) has modelled an old leftist argument, suggesting that, 
besides redistribution, there are other dimensions in the political debate (such as 
debates on ethnic and religious issues, for example) that divide pro-redistribution 
voters. Similarly, Luttmer (2001) and Alesina et al. (2001) argue that ethnic divisions 
are harmful to redistribution because many individuals tend to oppose it when the 
beneficiaries are mainly members of other ethnic groups. 
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By contrast, other authors maintain that, far from increasing, redistribution 
decreases with inequality. Lindert (2004) calls this the Robin Hood paradox and says 
that support for redistribution does not depend on the gap between the median voter's 
income and the average earnings, but on the gap between the middle-income groups 
(who are electorally decisive) and the lower-income groups. If the gap between both 
groups is small enough, then the middle-income groups will probably be more 
empathetic towards the beneficiaries of social policy. They can even feel that they 
themselves may at some point become potential beneficiaries of social policy and, 
therefore, they will be more willing to support redistribution. 
 
The model by Kristov et al. (1992) also helps to explain why inequality could 
have a negative effect on redistribution. According to these authors, an individual's 
political participation depends on his or her absolute level of income. This is because 
(absolute) poverty increases the time preference for present consumption and reduces 
any type of saving, including investment in political activities (whether in the form of 
time or money). Therefore, if inequality involves an increase in absolute poverty levels, 
then social groups more willing to support redistribution will be excluded from the 
political process, and the political pressure in favour of redistribution will lessen. 
 
According to Bénabou (2000, 2004), if there are market failures, then 
redistribution may generate efficiency gains.3 These, in turn, can offset the cost of 
redistribution for a portion of those individuals who initially pay for it. In an egalitarian 
society, where the level of income of the wealthiest individuals is not much higher than 
the average, the cost of redistribution for the former will not be very high and will be 
easily offset by the efficiency gains. Consequently, resistance to redistributive policies 
will be low. By contrast, in a society with high inequality there will be a large number of 
sufficiently wealthy individuals for which the efficiency gains will not offset the cost of 
redistribution. As a result, political support for redistribution will be lower. 
 
Bénabou (2000, 2004) also considers that, even in democratic countries, 
political power and influence depend on income levels,4 so that the upper-income 
                                                 
3 A good example would be public investment in education, which finance the education of many students 
with no access to private credit, increases the provision of human capital and stimulates economic growth. 
4 Using data from Rosenston and Hansen (1993) and Bartels (2002) for the United States, Bénabou (2000) 
shows that the poorest and least educated individuals tend to vote less, contribute less to electoral 
campaigns (in economic terms), and participate less in time-intensive activities (such as writing to their 
Members of Congress, attending meetings or campaigning for their political choice). In addition, senators 
and congressmen are usually much more sensitive to the demands of high income groups. In developing 
countries, the bias in favour of high income groups is probably more acute due to practices such as vote-
buying, graft and outright intimidation. 
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groups have more political influence than the lower-income groups.5 This means that 
the decisive voter will not be the median voter but someone located at some point in the 
distribution above him/her.6 This reinforces the negative relationship between 
inequality and redistribution described above. Thus, in a context of low inequality, the 
consensus that favours redistribution will be strengthened by the fact that political 
power will also be fairly distributed. In a context of increasing inequality, however, the 
pressures against redistribution will be strengthened because the relative political 
power of the wealthiest will also be higher. 
 
Finally, Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Rodrik (1999) maintain that 
macroeconomic stabilizations are usually delayed in countries with high levels of 
inequality. The reason is that they have greater difficulties in reaching a consensus on 
how the stabilization costs should be shared. Similarly, Berg and Sachs (1988) argue 
that countries with higher inequality have to renegotiate their foreign debt more 
frequently because they find it more difficult to stabilize their budget in the long term. 
These theories do not explicitly refer to social policy. However, it seems reasonable to 
believe that countries with high inequality will also find it more difficult to reach 
agreements as to how social policy should be funded. In all likelihood, the redistributive 
implications of each funding alternative (basically direct taxes, indirect taxes and social 
security contributions) will become more acute. If inequality is high, for example, the 
regressive character of indirect taxes will be more pronounced, and the opposition of 
the poorest will also be more intense. The same could apply to direct taxes, but the 
other way round: their progressive character will become more pronounced and the 
opposition of the wealthiest will also be greater. 
 
 
3. Social protection indicators before 1930-33 
 
The social transfers database, created by Lindert, is no doubt the most 
important that exists for the pre-World War II period. It provides information for over 
                                                 
5 Note that, according to Bénabou (2000, 2004), political influence depends on the relative level of income 
and not on its absolute level. If political influence depended on absolute income, once a certain income 
threshold had been crossed there would be no inequality of power between rich and poor; and inequality 
would only be able to reduce the political power of the poor if it involved an increase in absolute poverty. 
6 Let us suppose that the decisive voter is located in percentile 
*100 p×  (where *p  is between 0  and 1). 
In a perfect democracy, this would be located at 2/1* =p , i.e. it would be the median voter. If the 
democracy is imperfect and the capacity for political influence increases with income, then the decisive 
voter will be located at 2/1* >p . Formally this is equivalent to saying that the poor vote less and/or their 
votes are worth less. 
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20 different countries in 10-year intervals between 1880 and 1930 (1880, 1890, 1900, 
1910, 1920, 1930).7 According to Lindert's definition, social transfers include tax-
funded public provisions. However, social insurance benefits (which were funded by 
public subsidies plus employers and employees contributions) are not included in the 
estimations because they do not imply redistribution through public-budgets. Only 
public subsidies to social insurance schemes are included (Lindert, 1992, 1994). Neither 
are provisions for civil servants included. Lindert considers these to be the result of the 
particular labour relationship existing between the State and its employees. Therefore 
they receive the same treatment as the private-collective insurance benefits that many 
companies offer their employees. Finally, Lindert classifies social transfers by 
programme (pensions, health, and welfare and unemployment), but this classification 
should be analysed with caution, because, as Lindert himself warned, it is difficult to be 
precise about the aim of many social programmes, which were often oriented towards 
the poor in general. 
 
The definition of social transfers adopted by Lindert is aimed at capturing the 
impact of those social protection measures that implied redistribution via public 
budgets and were addressed to the population as a whole and not to specific groups 
(such as civil servants). However, the exclusion of social insurance provisions may 
seem more controversial. At least at the time of their creation, social insurances must 
have had far-reaching redistribution implications (although not via the public budget). 
Social insurance contributions meant an obvious expense for both employers and 
employees, and each of those groups must have tried to impose the largest possible 
burden of cost on the other.8 In some cases, these fights over redistribution even put 
the introduction of social insurances in jeopardy. For example, one of the reasons why 
the French law of 1910 establishing mandatory social insurances failed was because 
workers refused to pay the mandatory contributions (Ashford, 1989). Similarly, the 
                                                 
7 The data is available on Lindert's website (http://lindert.econ.ucdavis.edu/index.cfm?employeeid=17 
&currentNav=12). The information there is almost identical to that published in Lindert (1994) and the 
working-paper version (Lindert, 1992), though with slight updating. However, several countries for which 
Lindert (1994) warned there were problems with the data do not appear in the latest version. These 
problems may have arisen because there was no information on certain relevant explanatory variables 
(Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia), because they were not independent countries for most of the period 
(Ireland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland), or because the exact level of social spending was not known 
(Germany and Switzerland). Moreover, in earlier versions, the information for most of these countries 
referred only to 1930. To keep homogeneity, the mentioned countries have not been included in the next 
section’s econometric analysis. Therefore the countries included in the sample are: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. 
Table A.1 in the appendix shows Lindert’s estimates of social transfers. 
8 In the long term, it is plausible to assume that social contributions are equivalent to a tax on labour, no 
matter whether they are paid by employers or employees (Bandrés, 1998). However, it does not mean that 
they did not involved redistributive fights at the time of their creation.  
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Spanish Workers' Compulsory Retirement Act of 1919 only imposed the obligation to 
contribute on employers, precisely to avoid labour opposition (Elu, 2006). 
 
Social insurances played an important role in the configuration of modern social 
protection systems in many continental European countries. Consequently, they have 
been the focus of much attention in a number of studies on the origins of the welfare 
state (such as Flora and Heidenheimer, 1981; Flora, 1983; Baldwin, 1990; and Hicks, 
1999). As Lynch (2006) points out, it seems that when modern social policy was being 
shaped, there were two alternative forms of public intervention: one based on citizens' 
rights, predominant in Anglo-Saxon countries and Scandinavia, and another in which 
benefits were linked to the position in the labour market. In the former, the aim of 
social policy was to cover the gaps in private insurance and friendly societies. In these 
cases the State offered tax-funded non-contributory provisions for children, the sick 
and the elderly who had no private coverage. In the latter, social policy focused on 
forcing companies to fund their employees' social insurances (normally along with the 
workers themselves, plus state subsidies). Hence, only workers (with jobs) received 
social protection. Many countries of continental Europe chose to follow the second 
path. However, under the influence of the Beveridge report, many of them tried to unify 
and universalize their social protection systems after World War II. The importance of 
social insurances in the origins of the welfare state is also reflected in the OECD 
definitions of public social spending. In both the first database published in 1985 and 
the current series, OECD definitions include those provisions charged to social security 
funds,9 which are the descendants of the former social insurances. It is therefore 
interesting to analyse the determinants of spending on social protection including 
social insurance provisions too. 
 
With this aim in mind, I have made a new estimation of social spending levels in 
1930 and 1933, which includes social insurances’ benefits. My sample incorporates 22 
countries, which are: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Poland, 
Portugal, the Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and 
Yugoslavia.10 The information comes from the reports on social protection published by 
the International Labour Office in 1933 and 1936, which distinguish between two types 
of social spending: spending on social security and spending on social assistance. In the 
case of Portugal the information comes from Valerio (2001), while for Spain the 
                                                 
9 OECD (1985) p 76; OECD (2007) pp 8-9. 
10 In some cases, the information for certain social spending items were not available for 1930 and 1933 but 
for other nearby years such as 1929, 1931 or 1934. 
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information has been estimated directly from public budgets, the Spanish statistical 
yearbooks and the reports and statistics of the Spanish National Institute of Social 
Insurance (Instituto Nacional de Previsión). For convenience, from now on we will use 
the term social transfers to refer to Lindert's estimations and the term social spending 
to refer to our alternative database11. 
 
This new estimation includes tax-funded benefits provided by the public 
authorities, typically public spending on health-care, poor-relief, unemployment, and 
non-contributory pensions. It also includes compulsory social insurances’ benefits 
(basically workmen’s compensation, pensions, sickness-leave, maternity-leave and 
unemployment compensation). Subsidized voluntary social insurances’ benefits are 
only included as long as they were regulated and funded by the State. Normally, 
government regulations on voluntary (subsidized) social insurances established benefit 
levels (maximum benefits, maximum duration -in days or weeks- of benefits, etc.) and 
qualifying conditions (maximum annual income which workers may earn and still be 
qualified for benefits, minimum age, the economic sectors covered by the insurance, 
minimum contribution period, “waiting periods”, etc.). In order to qualify for public 
subsidies, unions, mutual-aids and any other institution providing voluntary 
(subsidized) social insurance were required to accept these regulations. Therefore the 
degree of government control was considerable. 
 
Subsidized voluntary social insurance was sometimes conceived as a first step 
towards compulsory social insurances. However, especially in Scandinavian countries, 
they became very important in terms of the number of people insured and the level of 
benefits.12 In any case, subsidized voluntary insurances should not be confused with 
pure private insurances. The latter could also cover social risks such as sickness or 
unemployment, but received no public subsidies (or very little) and were only subject to 
the general regulations governing friendly societies and/or insurance companies, but in 
no case to a strict specific legislation for each type of risk. The provisions of pure 
private insurance have not been included in our estimations. Neither have the benefits 
for civil servants. Provisions for workers in public companies, however, have been 
included only when these workers were subject to general legislation on social 
protection and it was clear that those benefits were not the result of a private labour 
relationship with the public company. 
                                                 
11 Table A.2 in the appendix shows my new estimates of social spending. 
12 For figures on affiliates to social insurances (both compulsory and subsidized voluntary) from the end of 
the 19th century, see Flora (1983). For health insurance and the importance of subsidized voluntary 
insurances in many countries, see Murray (2007). For the importance of the so-called Ghent model, which 
was the subsidized voluntary insurance in the case of unemployment, see Espuelas (2010). 
11 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the main types of social protection provisions that coexisted at 
the early stages of modern social policy: direct public benefits, social insurances 
benefits, and private insurance and friendly societies. Our estimation includes direct 
public benefits plus social insurances benefits (both compulsory and subsidized 
voluntary ones). Lindert's estimation includes only direct public benefits plus public 
subsidies for social insurances, but not their benefits. Private insurance and friendly 
societies benefits are not included in either of the two estimations. 
 
Figure 1. Alternative ways of social protection in the initial stages of the 
welfare state 
 
 
 
In order to express the social spending data as a percentage of GDP we have 
used Clark's (1957) estimations of current GDP, except for Spain and Portugal, where 
GDP figures have been taken from Prados de la Escosura (2003) and Valerio (2001) 
respectively, and for the GDP of the Soviet Union, which is based on Allen (2003), who 
provides data on the Soviet GDP in 1937 roubles for the period 1928-1940 and gives 
information on the evolution of prices between 1927-28 and 1937. Table 1 shows a 
comparison between the levels of social transfers estimated by Lindert for 1930 and 
our estimations of social spending for the same year. As expected, the levels of social 
spending are higher in our estimation, which includes social insurances benefits. Only 
in the cases of Finland and Yugoslavia Lindert's figures are slightly higher than those 
presented here, which is probably explained by the fact that the sources used are not 
exactly the same. In some countries the difference between the two estimates is not 
very wide. For instance, our estimate for Ireland amounts to 4.48% of GDP as opposed 
to 3.87% in the case of Lindert’s data. However, sometimes the difference is much 
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bigger. For example, social spending in the UK in 1930 was 6.52% of GDP, according to 
our estimations, while according to Lindert's estimations it was just 2.32%. In the case 
of Czechoslovakia, our estimations of social spending are also much higher: 2.91% of 
GDP as opposed to 0.51%. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of social transfers and social spending in 1930 (% of GDP) 
 
(Lindert’s estimates)  (own estimation) 
 
social 
transfers 
(1) 
Ranking 
order 
(2) 
social 
spending 
(3) 
Ranking  
order 
(4) 
Germany 4.96 1 11.15 1  
Ireland 3.87 2 4.48 5  
Denmark 3.11 3 4.80 4  
Finland 2.97 4 2.11 10  
Sweden 2.59 5 3.84 6  
UK 2.32 6 6.52 2  
Australia 2.11 7 5.79 3  
Switzerland 1.17 8 2.18 9  
Poland 1.08 9 2.03 11  
France 1.05 10 2.49 8  
Holland 1.03 11 1.61 14  
Belgium 0.56 12 1.83 13  
Czechoslovakia 0.51 13 2.91 7  
Spain 0.45* 14 0.44* 18  
Portugal 0.35* 15 0.35* 19  
Canada 0.31 16 0.68 16  
Japan 0.21 17 0.67 17  
Hungary 0.10 18 1.88 12  
Yugoslavia 0.09 19 0.07 21  
Italia 0.08 20 1.40 15  
Bulgaria 0.02 21 0.14 20  
Sources: figures on social transfers for Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Holland, Italy, Japan, 
Sweden and the UK come from Lindert’s web site. Figures on Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Ireland, 
Poland, Switzerland and Yugoslavia come from Lindert (1994). Note that, as mentioned in footnote 6, the information 
for the latter group of countries is, in most cases, only available for 1930. For this reason, they have not been included in 
next section’s econometric analysis. Here they have been included for comparative reasons only. 
* Social transfers in both Spain and Portugal are my own and have been estimated following Lindert’s definition (for 
more details see notes on table A.1). 
 
If all the countries are ordered according to their level of generosity, no great 
differences can be seen, in the sense that the 10 most generous countries are still 
practically the same: basically the developed countries of north-west Europe plus 
Australia. The 10 least generous countries, those occupying the bottom half of Table 1, 
are also still practically the same. However, there are a few changes in their relative 
positions when social insurance benefits are included. Germany's top position, for 
example, is more evident in the last column of the Table. Meanwhile the Scandinavian 
countries (where public subsidies for voluntary social insurances were very important) 
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lose out to Great Britain and Australia, which move up into second and third position 
respectively. Italy, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (where social insurance provisions 
played a very important role) move up a number of places. In short, the new 
estimations produce noticeably higher figures for social spending than Lindert's 
estimations and also bring about changes in relative positions, with a relative 
improvement of those countries where social insurances played an important role. 
 
Finally, as in the case of Lindert’s data, our estimates can also be broken down 
by programme. However, the information contained in the ILO reports is not 
completely homogeneous. Classification criteria and the level of detail of the 
information varied from country to country. Despite the difficulties, we have been able 
to classify benefits into 3 categories of social spending: pensions, health, and welfare 
and unemployment. The first one includes old-age, survivors's and widow's pensions, 
plus workmen’s compensation. The latter awarded disability pensions and also 
temporary incapacity benefits. However, it was impossible to distinguish between 
them. Consequently they have all been grouped together under the pensions heading. 
Health spending includes health-care spending plus sickness and maternity leave 
benefits. Finally, spending on welfare and unemployment includes family allowances, 
benefits for the unemployed, and the traditional poor-relief which was often given to 
the sick, the unemployed or the elderly without distinguishing between them. 
 
 
4. The determinants of social transfers between 1880 and 1930 
 
4.1. Data and variables 
 
The aim of this section is to analyse the role of inequality in the early stages of 
social policy. The basic model to be estimated is given by Equation (1): 
 
(1)   1210 εααα +++= ZINEQREDIST  
 
where REDIST is the level of redistribution, INEQ is the level of inequality, and 
Z is a group of variables that are normally included in comparative studies on the 
determinants of social policy. The series of social transfers estimated by Lindert is used, 
in this section, as an indicator of redistribution. As mentioned earlier, it covers the 
time-period 1880-1930; the information is available for 10-year intervals (1880, 1890, 
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1900, 1910, 1920 and 1930) and embraces 21 different countries. In the case of Spain 
the figures are our own and in the case of Portugal they come from Valerio (2001). 
 
Two alternative variables that capture the distribution of income before taxes 
have been used as a proxy of inequality: the percentage of non-family farms and the top 
income shares. Information on the former comes from Vanhanen (1997), who defines a 
family farm as one that provides work for a maximum of four people, including family 
members. The size of family farms can therefore change over time and from one 
country to another, depending on the technology or weather conditions. The purpose of 
this criterion is to separate family farms from big farms worked by paid employees. 
Note that it is the percentage of non-family farms (the opposite of Vanhanen's 
percentage of family farms) that is used here, because the aim is to have an indicator of 
inequality, not equality. 
 
The percentage of non-family farms variable has the advantage of not being 
subject to problems of endogeneity, because there is no reason to think that social 
transfers had a direct influence on the distribution of land ownership. However, this 
indicator loses representativity as the industrialization process advances and 
agriculture loses weight in the economy. Even so, it appears to be a reasonable proxy, 
especially in a period such as ours on which information is very limited and the 
agrarian sector was much more important than nowadays. In fact, this variable has 
been used in a number of earlier studies as a proxy for overall inequality (Vanhanen, 
1997; Boix, 2003; Keefer and Knack, 2002). Similarly, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) used 
land inequality as a proxy for overall inequality. 
 
Nevertheless, given the limitations of the percentage of non-family farms 
variable, the top income shares have also been used as an inequality proxy in order to 
make the exercise more robust. At first glance there should be no endogeneity problems 
here either since the top income shares are based on information that captures pre-tax 
income levels. Atkinson et al. (2009) maintain that top income shares can have a 
considerable influence on the evolution of the Gini coefficient and therefore they would 
appear to be a reasonable indicator of inequality. However, their main drawback is that 
they refer to a very small percentage of population and therefore do not capture those 
income variations that occur in the lower part or the centre of the distribution. Top 
income shares data come from Atkinson et al. (2007) and from Guilera (2010) in the 
case of Portugal. Both sources provide information covering various percentages of the 
wealthiest population (the top 10%, 5%, 1% etc.). Here, we have used the top 0.1% 
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income share because this was the band that offered the greatest number of 
observations, although the number is still small: 39 in the time-period 1880-1930. 
Nevertheless, this variable has been maintained to allow comparisons with the results 
obtained with the percentage of non-family farms. 
 
The control variables (parameter Z in Equation 1) include the logarithm of GDP 
per capita, the ageing of population –measured by the percentage of population over 
65– and the degree of political democratization. GDP figures come from Maddison, the 
percentage of population over 65 has been taken from the Lindert website database, 
except for Spain, which comes from Nicolau (2005); and the polity2 index created by 
the Polity IV Project -which ranges from -10 (perfect autocracy) to 10 (perfect 
democracy)- has been used to measure the degree of democratization. The expected 
sign of the coefficients of the income level and ageing of population variables is 
positive. Actually, Pampel and Williamson (1989) and Mulligan et al. (2010) consider 
that they are the most important variables to explain the development of social policy. 
The expected sign of the degree of democratization, however, is less clear. Initially one 
might think that democracy should have a positive effect on social spending, since it 
guarantees the right to vote to lower-income groups and allows the existence of left-
wing parties and workers' unions (Lindert, 1994; Hicks, 1999; Espuelas, forthcoming). 
Mulligan et al. (2010), however, maintain that the existence of democracy is not 
determinant for the development of social policy. Hence the expected sign of this 
variable is not clear. 
 
4.2. Results 
 
A. Percentage of non-family farms as an indicator of inequality  
 
As in Lindert (1994), the estimation method used in the regressions is a tobit 
model, because our endogenous variable, the level of social transfers as a share of GDP, 
is partially censored. Below a certain threshold it takes value zero, but this does not 
indicate that the “real” level of social transfers was really zero. It just means that social 
transfers must have been very low, close to zero, but the available sources do not allow 
to precise the “real” value. Column 1 of Table 2 presents the results of estimating the 
basic model of Equation (1). As expected, both the level of GDP per capita and the 
ageing of population show a positive and statistically significant impact on total social 
transfers. The coefficient associated to the degree of democratization is also positive 
and clearly significant. This indicates that the advent of democracy and the subsequent 
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incorporation of lower-income groups into the political process stimulated the 
development of social policy. Inequality, on the other hand, approximated by the 
percentage of non-family farms, has a negative and highly significant effect, just the 
opposite of what would have been expected according to the median voter models. 
However, our sample includes both democratic and non-democratic countries, and 
median voter models apply only to democratic countries. Therefore, in order to strictly 
test the median voter hypothesis, the regressions have been re-run adding a 
multiplicative variable (democracy * inequality) in column 2. Thus the new estimation 
becomes: 
 
(2) 13210 εαααα ++×++= ZDemocracyINEQINEQREDIST  
 
where DemocracyINEQ×  is the new multiplicative variable and the rest of the 
parameters are the same as in Equation (1). The total marginal effect of inequality 
under democracy in this new estimation would be: 
 
(3) Democracy
INEQ
REDIST ×+=∂
∂
21 αα  
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Table 2. The determinants of total social transfers as a % of GDP, 1880-1930 (I) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  
                   
C -5.070 *** -4.802 *** -4.875 *** -4.882 *** -4.635 *** -4.600 *** -4.298 *** -3.607 * -3.628 * 
 (1.150)  (1.144)  (1.142)  (1.167)  (1.167)  (1.165)  (1.180)  (1.857)  (1.882)  
Log(GDP per cap) 0.583 *** 0.602 *** 0.582 *** 0.556 *** 0.537 *** 0.542 *** 0.520 *** 0.589 *** 0.591 *** 
 (0.130)  (0.130)  (0.128)  (0.132)  (0.136)  (0.132)  (0.135)  (0.187)  (0.186)  
Elderly 0.257 *** 0.248 *** 0.253 *** 0.251 *** 0.246 *** 0.245 *** 0.238 *** 0.189 * 0.190 * 
 (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.105)  (0.106)  
Democracy 0.025 ** -0.028    0.024 ** 0.028 **     0.004    
 (0.012)  (0.036)    (0.012)  (0.013)      (0.013)    
Non-family farms -0.010 *** -0.015 *** -0.012 *** -0.010 *** -0.009 *** -0.012 *** -0.012 *** -0.030 *** -0.030 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.011)  (0.010)  
Non-family farms*democracy   0.0008  0.0004 **     0.0004 ** 0.0005 ***   0.0001  
   (0.001)  (0.000)      (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  
Time-trend       0.022    0.030        
       (0.040)    (0.040)        
1890         -0.085    -0.076      
         (0.185)    (0.184)      
1900         -0.196    -0.173      
         (0.206)    (0.204)      
1910         -0.168    -0.148      
         (0.197)    (0.193)      
1920         -0.165    -0.142      
         (0.216)    (0.212)      
1930         0.151    0.206      
         (0.242)    (0.246)      
Country Fixed-Effects no  no  no  no  no  no  no  yes  yes  
                   
Mean dep. variable 0.579  0.579  0.579  0.579  0.579  0.579  0.579  0.579  0.579  
Standard error of regression 0.511  0.512  0.509  0.511  0.514  0.511  0.514  0.292  0.293  
Log likelihood -96.026  -95.441  -95.592  -95.895  -94.139  -95.356  -93.439  -29.525  -29.490  
Left censored obs. 39  39  39  39  39  39  39  39  39  
Left non censored obs. 81  81  81  81  81  81  81  81  81  
Total obs. 120   120   120   120   120   120   120   120   120   
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Notes: dependent variable is total social transfers as a % of GDP. Estimation method is tobit regressions. The sample is composed of 21 countries and six time-benchmarks (1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930). A 
few observations are missing. Therefore, total number of observations is 120, instead of 126. Time-dummies in columns 5 and 7 have been included for 5 of the 6 time-benchmarks in the analysis to avoid perfect 
multicollinearity. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%. 
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Notice that our democracy indicator is a continuous variable that ranges 
between -10 and 10 (where 10 is the maximum level of democracy), and that our 
inequality indicator is a percentage that ranges between 0 and 100 (where 100 is the 
maximum level of inequality). Therefore, if the predictions of the median voter models 
are correct, this variable should have a positive sign: the greater the inequality and the 
more democratic the political context, the greater the level of redistribution should be. 
As can be seen in column 2 of Table 2, the coefficient associated with the multiplicative 
variable is indeed positive. However, it is very small in absolute value and it is not 
significant. This suggests that the impact of inequality, even in democracy, continues to 
be negative. Nevertheless, the new estimation may have problems of multicollinearity 
between this new multiplicative variable and the democracy variable.13 To test that the 
result obtained is robust, in column 3 of Table 2 the analysis has been repeated 
eliminating the democracy variable. In this new estimation the coefficient associated 
with the interaction between democracy and inequality maintains its positive sign and 
becomes significant, but it is still very small in absolute value. From Equation (3) we 
can calculate the total marginal effect of inequality on social transfers under 
democracy. According to the regression in column 3, this would be: 
 
(3.1) Democracy
INEQ
REDIST ×+−=∂
∂ 0004.0012.0  
 
Therefore, in a situation of perfect democracy (where democracy = 10) the 
marginal effect of inequality would be: 
 
(3.1.a) 008.0100004.0012.0 −=×+−=∂
∂
INEQ
REDIST
 
 
while in a situation of perfect absence of democracy (where democracy = -10) 
the marginal effect of inequality would be: 
 
(3.1.b) 016.0)10(0004.0012.0 −=−×+−=∂
∂
INEQ
REDIST
 
                                                 
13 To check for the existence of multicollinearity, a VIF test was applied on the democracy variable in the 
regression of column 2. The value obtained is greater than 35, which confirms that there is a problem of 
multicollinearity (according to Greene (2003), any value above 20 is indicative of the existence of 
multicollinearity). In the regressions in columns 1 and 3, however, these problems do not exist. The results 
of the VIF tests applied (on the democracy variable in column 1 and on the interaction in column 3) in both 
cases produce a value close to 4, which confirms that there are no serious multicollinearity problems. 
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This means: 1) that inequality had a negative effect on social transfers in both 
democratic and non-democratic contexts, and 2) that this negative effect was more 
moderate in democracy. This confirms that democratic governments were more 
sensitive to demands for redistribution than dictatorships. However, the fact that 
inequality had a negative effect on the development of social policy even in democracy 
is a particularly interesting result with important implications. Contrary to what many 
studies on the origins of the welfare state appear to implicitly suggest, inequality did 
not favour the development of social policy even in its initial stages (when the level of 
social transfers was really low and social needs were therefore greater than today). 
However, the fact that social policy developed more easily in countries that were 
previously more egalitarian suggests that unequal societies were in a sort of inequality 
trap, where inequality itself was one of the main obstacles to redistribution. 
 
Following Niskanen (1971), one might argue that once social programmes are 
established they have a tendency to grow by themselves (due to the aspirations of 
bureaucracy), giving rise to a kind of inertia effect. In other words, the growth of social 
transfers may be no more than the result of a simple time trend. Similarly, one might 
argue that the evolution of social transfers depends on shocks occurring at specific 
moments, such as the impact of the World War I or the copycat effect that may have 
come about after the pioneering countries introduced the first social protection 
measures. To test both possibilities and give more robustness to the analysis, we have 
repeated the previous regressions including a time trend and time fixed-effects that 
should capture the influence of specific shocks. As is shown in columns 4 to 7 in Table 
2, neither the annual dummies nor the time trends are statistically significant. The rest 
of variables maintain the expected sign and very similar levels of significance, which 
confirms the previous results. 
 
Finally, the evolution of social transfers between 1880 and 1930 might be also 
determined, to some extent, by specific country characteristics. Although the tobit 
estimations with country fixed-effects could be inconsistent and biased –and therefore 
the results should be interpreted with caution14– to give more robustness to the 
analysis we repeated the previous estimations including country fixed-effects. As is 
shown in columns 8 and 9 of Table 2, the results are similar to the previous ones. All 
                                                 
14 Although it is normal to consider that the maximum likelihood estimators in non-linear panel data 
models with fixed effects are biased and inconsistent, Greene (2004) maintains that the tobit estimators 
are unaffected by this problem. Thus the coefficients of the estimation are not biased, although the 
disturbance variation is, and this bias could be transmitted into the calculation of marginal effects. 
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the variables maintain the expected sign, but democracy and the percentage of 
population over 65 lose significance. 
 
B. Top income shares as an indicator of inequality 
 
In order to corroborate the previous results, I have repeated the above analysis 
using the top income shares as an indicator of inequality (Table 3). However, the 
information available in this case is much more limited. There are only 39 observations 
involving 13 countries (Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Japan, The Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, Portugal and 
Argentina). The years available vary from country to country, although in most cases 
they are from the early decades of the 20th century.15 The estimation method is least 
squares,16 and given the scant number of observations, I have used country random-
effects instead of country fixed-effects, because the latter would have been very costly in 
terms of losing degrees of freedom. The Hausman test was applied and no evidence was 
found for rejecting the random-effects model. Finally, just as before, we also checked 
for time effects, introducing a time trend and time-dummies (columns 4 to 7). 
 
In general the results are very similar to those obtained with the percentage of 
non-family farms. Both the log of GDP and the ageing of population had a positive 
effect, although when time-effects are included they tend to lose significance. 
Democracy also maintains its positive sign, but is not significant in any of the new 
regressions. As far as the top income shares variable is concerned, the results again 
confirm that inequality had a negative impact on social transfers regardless of whether 
we test for time effects or not (columns 1, 4 and 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Table A.3 in the appendix shows the figures on top incomes that have been used in the regression 
analysis. 
16 Instead of a tobit model, the least squares method was used because there is now a single censored 
observation. 
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Table 3. The determinants of total social transfers as a % of GDP, 1880-1930 (II) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  
               
C -4.745 * -5.051 * -4.733 * -6.097  -4.531  -6.061  -4.553  
 (2.767)  (2.929)  (2.622)  (4.193)  (4.028)  (3.944)  (3.739)  
Log(GDP per cap) 0.689 ** 0.756 * 0.690 ** 0.877  0.753  0.875 * 0.770  
 (0.317)  (0.393)  (0.287)  (0.527)  (0.506)  (0.484)  (0.459)  
Elderly 0.172 ** 0.174 ** 0.171 ** 0.183 ** 0.096  0.180 ** 0.102  
 (0.083)  (0.086)  (0.082)  (0.088)  (0.102)  (0.087)  (0.099)  
Democracy 0.002  -0.034    0.000  0.018      
 (0.021)  (0.112)    (0.021)  (0.023)      
Top incomes (0.1%) -0.136 ** -0.167  -0.138 ** -0.143 *** -0.129 * -0.143 *** -0.147 ** 
 (0.053)  (0.112)  (0.053)  (0.052)  (0.068)  (0.050)  (0.059)  
Top incomes (0.1%)*democracy   0.005  0.0004      0.0003  0.002  
   (0.013)  (0.003)      (0.003)  (0.003)  
Time-trend       -0.047    -0.048    
       (0.077)    (0.075)    
1890         -0.312    -0.333  
         (0.211)    (0.208)  
1900         -0.325    -0.334  
         (0.218)    (0.224)  
1910         -0.305    -0.319  
         (0.271)    (0.278)  
1920         -0.657 *   -0.673 * 
         (0.333)    (0.336)  
1930         -0.289    -0.313  
         (0.386)    (0.373)  
               
Adjusted-R2 0.399  0.386  0.399  0.390  0.458  0.390  0.457  
Standard error of regression 0.387  0.384  0.386  0.382  0.347  0.381  0.350  
DW 2.098  2.122  2.107  2.203  2.130  2.217  2.067  
Obs. 39   39   39   39   39   39   39   
Notes: dependent variable is total social transfers as a % of GDP. Estimation method is least squares with country 
random-effects. The sample is composed of 13 countries and six time-benchmarks (1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930) 
conforming an unbalanced panel dataset. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** significance at 1%, ** significance at 
5%, * significance at 10%. 
 
As in the case of non-family farms, we wanted to check whether the effect of 
inequality is different in democratic contexts. In order to do this, we added the 
interaction between inequality and democracy in column 2. As expected the coefficient 
sign is positive, but is very small in absolute value and not significant, which suggest 
that inequality’s effect is still negative in democratic contexts. However, it seems that 
this new regression is affected by multicollinearity problems.17 For this reason I 
repeated the estimation eliminating the democracy variable from the regression. As is 
shown in columns 3, 6 and 7, inequality had a negative effect on social transfers since 
the coefficient associated with the top income shares variable is negative and highly 
significant, regardless of whether or not we check for time-effects. The coefficient 
                                                 
17 To check for the existence of multicollinearity, a VIF test was applied on the democracy variable in the 
regression in column 2. The value obtained is greater than 60, which indicates that there are problems of 
multicollinearity. In columns 1 and 3, however, there is no multicollinearity. In both cases the value 
obtained by applying the VIF tests (on the democracy variable in column 1 and the interaction in column 3) 
is less than 2, which confirms the absence of multicollinearity. 
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associated with the multiplicative variable, however, is positive but very small in 
absolute value. As was seen in the case of non-family farms, this would indicate that the 
negative effect of inequality is smaller in democracy, although this variable is not 
statistically significant. 
 
C. Impact of inequality on social transfers by programme 
 
If the social transfers are analysed by programme, the results are not very 
different from those obtained in the previous sections. However, a number of 
interesting extra details can be found. As can be seen in Table 4, inequality had a 
negative impact on the different types of spending. However, it appears that GDP per 
capita had almost no positive influence on welfare spending, since it is significant in 
only 1 of the 4 regressions where spending on welfare is the endogenous variable. It 
would also appear that democracy favoured growth in health and pensions 
expenditures, but had no significant effect on welfare spending. This suggests that 
traditional welfare was the predominant form of social protection in the least developed 
and least democratic countries. 
 
Table 4a. The determinants of social transfers by program, 1880-1930 
dep. var. Pensions Health Welfare Pensions Health Welfare 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C -6.239 *** -1.752 *** -1.609 ** -1.339 -1.430 -2.004 
(1.225) (0.578) (0.680) (0.826) (1.289) (1.619) 
Log(GDP per cap) 0.724 *** 0.194 *** 0.134 * 0.212 ** 0.259 * 0.217 
(0.154) (0.072) (0.073) (0.089) (0.149) (0.186) 
Elderly 0.118 *** 0.071 *** 0.177 *** 0.016 0.017 0.142 *** 
(0.031) (0.017) (0.024) (0.045) (0.035) (0.045) 
Democracy 0.012 0.0219 *** 0.002 0.016 * -0.001 -0.012 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) 
Non-family farms -0.007 *** -0.003 ** -0.004 * 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Top incomes (0.1%) -0.046 * -0.0689 *** -0.020 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.033) 
Adjusted-R2 0.431 0.300 0.121 
DW 1.752 1.927 2.184 
Standard error of regression 0.194 0.216 0.274 0.154 0.177 0.216 
Log likelihood -37.989 -41.184 -48.352 
Left censored obs. 80 53 43 
Left non censored obs. 40 67 77 
Total obs. 120   120   120   39   39   39   
Notes: sample and estimation method in columns 1 to 3 are the same as in table 2. In columns 4 to 6 are the same as in 
table 3. 
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Table 4b. The determinants of social transfers by program, 1880-1930 
dep. var. Pensions Health Welfare Pensions Health Welfare 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C -5.977 *** -1.567 *** -1.464 ** -1.393 * -1.456 -1.885 
(1.198) (0.591) (0.668) (0.807) (1.225) (1.533) 
Log(GDP per cap) 0.702 *** 0.192 *** 0.116 0.232 *** 0.261 * 0.193 
(0.147) (0.071) (0.071) (0.085) (0.135) (0.169) 
Elderly 0.115 *** 0.067 *** 0.176 *** 0.018 0.017 0.139 *** 
(0.031) (0.017) (0.024) (0.045) (0.035) (0.045) 
Non-family farms -0.009 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 ** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Non-family farms*democ. 0.0003 * 0.0004 *** 0.0001 
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Top incomes (0.1%) -0.060 *** -0.067 *** -0.009 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.031) 
Top incomes (0.1%)*democ. 0.002 * 0.0002 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Adjusted-R2 0.432 0.301 0.115 
DW 1.734 1.936 2.202 
Standard error of regression 0.194 0.216 0.275 0.154 0.177 0.218 
Log likelihood -37.328 -39.862 -48.047 
Left censored obs. 80 53 43 
Left non censored obs. 40 67 77 
Total obs. 120   120   120   39   39   39   
Notes: see table 4a. 
 
 
5. The determinants of social spending in 1930-33 
 
As was seen earlier, in many countries the rise of the welfare state was closely 
linked to the development of social insurances. The aim of this section is to analyse 
whether the negative effect of inequality is maintained when we include social 
insurance provisions in the analysis. Therefore, the new estimation of social spending 
presented in Section 3 has been used as the endogenous variable for the analysis. The 
estimation method is least squares and, given the low number of observations (44 in 
total), it was considered best to include random effects instead of fixed effects since the 
latter would be very costly in terms of losing degrees of freedom. Also, some 
explanatory variables take the same value in 1930 as in 1933 because the information is 
only available for every 10 years or covers various years, and they therefore act as a 
quasi fixed-effect. 
 
The explanatory variables are practically the same as in the previous section. 
The percentage of non-family farms18 and top income shares are once again used as 
                                                 
18 In the Soviet Union the percentage of non-family farms takes value zero. In the 1930s, non-family farms 
basically belonged to the State and therefore they are not a good indicator of inequality or of the political 
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proxies of inequality. The percentage of population over 65 has been used to capture 
the effect of the ageing of population. The data come from Lindert's website, except in 
the case of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia, for which they have been taken from Mitchell (1998). The polity2 index 
from the Polity IV Project has again been used to measure the degree of 
democratization. In order to avoid possible distortions brought about by the impact of 
the Great Depression, instead of GDP per capita I have included the percentage of the 
working population in agriculture, which is a more stable indicator of economic 
development. The information comes from Mitchell (1998), except for the USSR and 
Spain, for which it has been taken from Allen (2003) and Nicolau (2005) respectively. 
Finally, in order to capture the effect of the economic cycle and, especially, to account 
for the impact of the Great Depression, the rate of economic growth during the previous 
five years (taken from Maddison) has also been included in the estimation.  
 
Table 5. The determinants of total social spending as a % of GDP, 1930-33 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
             
C 3.014  2.799  2.609  5.281  -8.280  5.528  
 (2.325)  (2.249)  (2.262)  (4.704)  (6.128)  (4.505)  
Agriculture population (%) -0.054 ** -0.058 ** -0.048 ** -0.071  -0.094  -0.076  
 (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.019)  (0.057)  (0.073)  (0.058)  
GDP growth rate (5 years) -0.230 *** -0.224 *** -0.232 *** -0.236 *** -0.198 *** -0.227 *** 
 (0.081)  (0.079)  (0.080)  (0.078)  (0.053)  (0.078)  
Elderly 0.633 *** 0.674 *** 0.623 *** 0.868  1.937 *** 0.859  
 (0.199)  (0.210)  (0.198)  (0.528)  (0.623)  (0.519)  
Democracy 0.011  -0.096    -0.001  0.907 ***   
 (0.028)  (0.103)    (0.065)  (0.267)    
Non family farms -0.042 *** -0.039 *** -0.038 ***       
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)        
Non family farms *democracy   0.002  0.001        
   (0.002)  (0.001)        
Top incomes (0.1%)       -0.919 ** 0.657  -0.893 ** 
       (0.325)  (0.565)  (0.329)  
Top incomes (0.1%)*democracy         -0.221 *** -0.005  
         (0.067)  (0.016)  
             
Adjusted R-squared 0.677  0.684  0.685  0.562  0.783  0.565  
S.E. of regression 0.908  0.915  0.911  0.702  0.447  0.700  
DW 2.030  2.074  2.021  2.082  2.069  2.117  
Obs. 44   44   44   24   24   24   
Notes: dependent variable is total social spending as a % of GDP. Estimation method is least squares with country 
random effects. In regressions 1 to 3, the sample is composed of 22 countries and two years (1930 and 1933), which 
sums 44 observations. In regressions 4 to 6, only 12 countries are included because the information on top incomes is 
much mire limited. A dummy variable for Germany is included in regressions 1 to 3. According to the quartiles method 
that country is an outlier. Its levels of social spending in 1930 and 1933 are out of the range [Q1-k(Q3-Q1),Q3+k(Q3-Q1)] 
where k=1,5 and Q1 and Q3 are the first and the last inter-quartiles respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** 
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
influence of upper-income groups. In fact the political conditions in this country in the 1930s would make 
likely to assume that rural landowners had no political power and that the agrarian reform of 1917 and the 
subsequent collectivization brought about a radical decrease in inequality. 
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As in the analysis of social transfers, firstly I estimated a model only with 
inequality and control variables (columns 1 and 4 of Table 5), and then I added the 
interaction between democracy and inequality (columns 2, 3, 5 and 6). As can be seen 
in Table 5, both the coefficient of the percentage of the working population in 
agriculture and the coefficient of percentage of population over 65 have the expected 
sign (negative and positively respectively). This means that economic development and 
the ageing of population had a positive effect on social spending (although this is not 
significant in all the regressions). The growth rate of GDP per capita over the previous 
five years, however, is highly significant and has a negative sign, which indicates that 
social spending had a counter-cyclical behaviour, as would be expected in the context 
of the Great Depression. 
 
The econometric results also confirm that inequality had a negative impact on 
the level of social spending when social insurances benefits are included in the analysis. 
Both the percentage of non-family farms and the top income shares have a negative 
sign and are significant in almost all the regressions (the only exception being the 
regression in column 5, but everything indicates that it has problems of 
multicollinearity).19 However, neither the variable democracy nor the interaction 
between inequality and democracy are significant in the regressions. Nonetheless, it 
should not be concluded that there were no differences in social spending levels 
between democracies and dictatorships during this period. As is shown next, the impact 
of democracy varied from one social programme to another. 
 
Table 6 shows the results of the analysis of social spending programme by 
programme. Table 6a shows the results of estimating a model only with the variable 
inequality and control variables, while Table 6b shows the results of estimating a model 
adding the interaction between democracy and inequality. As expected, it seems that 
the percentage of the working population in agriculture had a negative impact, which 
confirms that economic development had a positive effect (although it is not significant 
in all the regressions). The ageing of population had a positive and significant effect on 
pensions; and the GDP growth rate has a negative and significant sign, which suggests 
that social spending was counter-cycle. 
 
 
                                                 
19 This is suggested by the change of sign in the top income shares variable and in the interaction of that 
variable with democracy. To confirm whether multicollinearity exists, a VIF test was applied on the 
democracy variable. The result of this was a value in excess of 30, which confirms the existence of 
multicollinearity. In the other equations, however, the VIF tests applied indicate that there is no 
multicollinearity. 
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Table 6a. The determinants of social spending by program, 1930-33 
 Pensions  Health  Welfare Pensions  Health  Welfare  
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  
           
C 1.113 
 
0.173 
 1,962 
0.471 
 
0.161 
 5,243 * 
 
(0.775) 
 
(1.065) 
 (1,486) 
(1.244) 
 
(1.093) 
 (3,059) 
Agriculture population (%) -0.023 *** 0.003 
 -0,032 ** 
-0.027 * -0.003 
 -0,041 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0,015) (0.015)  (0.013)  (0,035) 
GDP growth rate (5 years) -0.057 ** -0.020  -0,130 *** -0.049 ** -0.013  -0,175 ** 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.016) 
 (0,052) 
(0.023) 
 
(0.020) 
 (0,069) 
Elderly 0.231 *** 0.114 
 0,208 
0.241 * 0.194 
 0,296 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.094) 
 (0,134) 
(0.137) 
 
(0.121) 
 (0,330) 
Democracy 0.002 
 
0.036 *** -0,007 0.001  
0.038 ** -0,058 
 (0.009)  (0.011)  (0,023) (0.019)  (0.016)  (0,054) 
Non family farms -0.015 *** -0.009  -0,015 ***     
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.007) 
 (0,005)     
Top incomes (0.1%) 
    
0.008 
 
-0.145 * -0,689 *** 
     
(0.093) 
 
(0.080) 
 (0,262) 
         
Adjusted R-squared 0.620  0.303  0,645 0.301  0.252  0,590 
S.E. of regression 0.352  0.162  0,726 0.216  0.183  0,652 
DW 2.094 
 
2.231 
 1,992 
1.621 
 
1.571 
 2,347 
Obs. 44   44   44   24   24   24   
Notes: see table 5. Unemp.=unemployment. TI=Top incomes. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6b. The determinants of social spending by program, 1930-33   
 
Pensions 
 
Health 
 
Welfare 
 
Pensions 
 
Health 
 
Welfare 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
         
C 1.004 
 
0.120 
 1,798 
0.459 
 
0.616 
 4,669 
 
(0.785) 
 
(0.997) 
 (1,470) 
(1.214) 
 
(1.079) 
 (2,957) 
Agriculture population (%) -0.021 *** 0.002 
 -0,029 ** 
-0.026 * -0.002 
 -0,046 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 (0,013) 
(0.015) 
 
(0.014) 
 (0,036) 
GDP growth rate (5 years) -0.058 ** -0.017 
 -0,132 *** 
-0.050 ** -0.011 
 -0,171 ** 
 (0.022)  (0.015)  (0,052) (0.023)  (0.020)  (0,067) 
Elderly 0.228 *** 0.126 
 0,197 
0.239 * 0.169 
 0,344 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.091) 
 (0,132) 
(0.138) 
 
(0.122) 
 (0,332) 
Non family farms -0.014 *** -0.008 
 -0,014 **     
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
 (0,006)     
Non fam. farm*democracy 0.0002  0.0007 *** 0,0001     
 (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0,0004)     
Top income (0.1%) 
    
0.008 
 
-0.208 ** -0,586 ** 
     
(0.095) 
 
(0.085) 
 (0,264) 
TI (0.1%)*democracy 
    
0.001 
 
0.008 ** -0,016 
     
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 (0,012) 
         
Adjusted R-squared 0.625  0.321  0,587 0.303  0.206  0,492 
S.E. of regression 0.352 
 
0.163 
 0,728 
0.210 
 
0.191 
 0,638 
DW 2.094 
 
2.282 
 2,003 
1.705 
 
1.646 
 2,300 
Obs. 44   44   44   24   24   24   
Notes: see table 6a. 
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As for the political variables, Table 6 shows that democracy’s effect varies from 
type to type of social spending. Nonetheless, as we found in the analysis of social 
transfers, it seems that democracy stimulated to a bigger extent the development of 
more modern and redistributive forms of social protection such as health-care. Finally, 
the coefficient associated to the inequality variables (non family farms and the top 
income shares) has a negative sign in almost all regressions (the only exception is 
column 4 in both tables). However, it is hard to find a clear pattern in the relationship 
between inequality and our different types of social spending. In the regressions where 
we use the percentage of non family farms as a proxy of inequality, it is significant in 
the cases of pensions and welfare. In contrast, in the regressions where we use the top 
income shares as a proxy of inequality, it is significant in the cases of health and 
welfare. I do not have a clear explanation for that, but, in general, it seems that 
inequality’s effect on social spending is also negative when specific social programmes 
are analyzed. 
 
 
6. Implications for the political regime 
 
The findings of the previous sections seem to suggest that, between 1880 and 
1930-33, inequality had a rather negative influence on the development of social policy, 
regardless of whether we use social transfers or social spending as an indicator of 
redistribution, and regardless of whether we use the percentage of non-family farms or 
top income shares as an indicator of inequality. This has some important implications 
for both economic growth and the political regime determinants. According to Alesina 
and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) inequality is harmful to economic 
growth because it leads to higher redistribution and taxation. However, if our results 
are correct, these theories fail to identify the mechanisms through which inequality 
hampers economic growth (because inequality does not appear to result in higher 
redistribution, but the opposite). In fact, there are a number of theories proposing 
alternative channels to explain why inequality is bad for economic growth. Bénabou 
(1996), for example, considers that, if there are market failures, inequality hampers 
human capital accumulation and, therefore, economic growth. Perotti (1996), however, 
suggests that inequality stimulates political violence, which, in turn, discourages 
investment. And Keefer and Knack (2002) maintain that inequality increases political 
polarization, provoking uncertainty on the protection of property rights and 
discouraging investment. 
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Our results also have implications for the political regime. From Boix (2003) y 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002, 2005), we can derive that inequality hinders the 
consolidation of democracy. In line with median voter models, Boix (2003) assumes 
that, in democratic contexts, inequality leads to higher redistribution. Consequently, if 
there is much inequality, the upper-income groups will be more willing to support 
autocratic governments to stop redistribution. In contrast, if there is not much 
inequality, then redistribution will be more moderate and democracy more stable. 
Similarly, Engerman and Sokoloff (2002, 2005) maintain that, in the New World, 
social elites tended to establish non-democratic institutions in order to protect their 
privileges. As a result, societies with high levels of inequality had more difficulties in 
developing democratic institutions. 
 
However, this paper’s results indicate that inequality, far from favouring 
redistribution, hindered the development of social policy. This raises an interesting 
question: if redistribution does not increase with inequality (not even in democracy), 
why do social elites need to support autocratic governments when inequality is high? 
The answer is straightforward. We do not need the relationship between inequality and 
redistribution to be positive in democracy for the economic elites to be willing to 
support autocratic governments. We just need that, for a given level of inequality, the 
level of redistribution is lower under non-democratic governments. 
 
Figure 2. 
Inequality, redistribution and political regime (I): Boix (2003) hypothesis 
 
 
 
30 
 
The simplest way of demonstrating this is with a diagram. Figure 2 represents 
the Boix (2003) hypothesis.20 The demo curve indicates that, in democracy, the 
relationship between inequality and redistribution is positive. The dic curve indicates 
that, under dictatorship, that relationship is negative.21 Therefore, the level of 
redistribution will always be higher in democracy (for any given level of inequality). 
According to Boix (2003), when the cost of redistribution exceeds a certain limit, the 
upper-income groups will be interested in supporting autocratic governments.22 Given 
that the level of redistribution under dictatorship is always lower than in democracy, in 
order for allow democracy to exist (and for the upper-income groups not to always 
prefer dictatorship for any level of inequality), the simplest thing is to assume that 
dictatorship represents a cost in itself, for example the economic cost of repression.23 
For simplicity we can assume that the cost of dictatorship is constant for any level of 
redistribution, which is equivalent to an upward shift of the dic curve in the diagram 
(where the distance c indicates the cost of maintaining the dictatorship). Therefore, as 
long as the level of inequality is located below d, democracy will be viable, but from this 
point onwards the upper-income groups will support non-democratic governments so 
as to avoid redistribution. 
 
Figure 3 shows the situation in which the relationship between inequality and 
redistribution is negative in both dictatorships and democracies. According to the 
previous econometric results (see Equations 3.1.a and 3.1.b), it has been assumed that 
the slope of the curve that relates inequality and redistribution is more negative in the 
case of dictatorships (see the dic and demo curves in Figure 3). This means that the 
ability of the lower-income groups (or in a wider sense, those groups in favour of 
redistribution) to impose redistribution is greater in democratic contexts. However, 
even in democracies, the relationship between inequality and redistribution will 
continue to be negative (which, actually, simply means that the levels of redistribution 
in an egalitarian democracy will be greater than in a democracy with much inequality). 
 
                                                 
20 Boix (2003)’s model not do not just focus on the role of fiscal redistribution when explaining the 
relationship between inequality and democracy/dictatorship. It also considers other factors such as the 
predominance of fixed assets in the economy, which according to Boix (2003) can be easily expropriated 
and constitute an additional source of political instability for democracies. However, this does not affect 
the argument developed in the text. 
21 In fact the relationship between inequality and redistribution does not need to be negative. It could be 
constant at a level set by the dictator. What according to Boix (2003)’s hypothesis is really necessary is that 
the level of redistribution under dictatorship is always below the level of redistribution in democracy. 
22 For simplicity we can assume that the cost of the redistribution in democracy is equivalent to 
redistribution itself, which is true if the State budget is kept balanced. 
23 It could also be considered that dictatorship implies moral or ideological costs. If democracy is 
considered as a good in itself, then simply the fact of being under the orders of a dictator already implies a 
cost. Therefore, the upper-income groups would be willing to accept certain levels of redistribution in order 
to live in a democracy. 
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Figure 3. Inequality, redistribution and political regime (II) 
 
 
As in the previous case, we can assume that the fact that a dictatorship exists 
implies a cost which is equivalent to an upward shift of the dic curve until it is located 
at dic’ (Figure 3). It can easily be seen in the diagram that, from point d onwards, the 
wealthiest sectors of society will have the incentive to support autocratic regimes 
because the cost of maintaining the dictatorship plus the cost of redistribution under 
dictatorship will be lower than the cost of redistribution in democracy. In other words, 
we do not need the relationship between inequality and redistribution to be positive in 
democracy for the upper-income groups to have the incentive to support autocratic 
regimes. We just need the slope of the curve in democracy to be less negative than 
under dictatorship. 
 
The final result obtained is not very different from that of Boix (2003) in the 
sense that, in both cases, democracy will be more unstable if inequality is very high. 
However, there is one very important difference. According to the Boix’s hypothesis, 
coups d'état will occur when redistribution levels are high (see Figure 2, redistribution 
at point d is higher than at any of the points to its left, in which democracy is viable) 
whereas, according to our results, coups d'état will occur when redistribution levels are 
lower, and not higher, than at any of the points in which the democracy is viable (see 
Figure 3). This fits in with the situation that seems to be more frequent in real life, 
32 
 
where stable democracies enjoy high levels of redistribution while many coups d'état 
occur in countries with high levels of inequality and little redistribution. 
 
The line of reasoning based on Figure 3 should in no way be interpreted as an 
attempt to formulate a model of the determinants of democracy. Boix (2003) himself 
mentions a whole series of variables that have not been considered here, such as 
international capital mobility, the weight of agrarian incomes in the economy, human 
capital, etc. Neither have been taken into account political variables, such as the 
relationship between inequality and social polarization (which according to Keefer and 
Knack (2002) helps to explain why inequality is harmful to economic growth), or the 
capacity of the different groups involved in the fight for redistribution to organize 
themselves politically and act as a pressure group (Acemoglu et al., 2005). The aim of 
this section was simply to show that we do not need the relationship between inequality 
and redistribution to be positive in democracy for economic elites to have the 
incentives to support autocratic regimes. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
It is often assumed that the fight against inequality played an important role 
during the early stages of the Welfare State. However, not many studies have tested this 
hypothesis from a quantitative and comparative perspective. In this paper, the impact 
of inequality on social policy between 1880 and 1930 has been analyzed, by using two 
alternative indicators of redistribution -social transfers and social spending- and two 
alternative proxies for inequality -the percentage of non-family farms and the top 
income shares-. Although it might look counter-intuitive, the econometric outcomes 
show that inequality did not favour the development of social policy even in its early 
stages. Curiously, more egalitarian countries were also pioneers in the rise of the 
Welfare State. Somehow, this means that unequal societies were in a sort of inequality 
trap, where inequality itself was one of the main obstacles to redistribution. 
 
There are at least three theoretical arguments to explain this apparent paradox. 
1) In the median voter theories it is assumed that redistribution implies dead-weight 
losses. However, if there are market failures, as Bénabou (2000, 2004) stresses, then 
redistribution can lead to efficiency gains, which (if inequality is low enough) can 
compensate for the cost of redistribution. Instead, as inequality rises, so does the 
number of individuals rich enough not to be compensated for the cost of redistribution. 
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Therefore, political support for redistribution will diminish. 2) In the median voter 
theories it is also assumed that, in democracy, political power is equally distributed, as 
all the citizens have the right to vote, and all the votes are worth the same. However, 
according to a number of recent studies, power and political influence depend on 
individuals’ income level. This means that if inequality increases then the political 
power of the well-off will be also reinforced, so they will be able to stop redistribution 
more easily. 3) Finally, it also looks plausible to consider, as Lindert (2004) does, that 
political support for redistribution does not depend on the gap between the median 
voter income and the average income, but on the gap between the median-income 
groups (who are decisive in the elections) and the lower-income groups. The closer is 
the distance between these two groups and the more the median-income groups believe 
that they can become beneficiaries of social policy, the larger the political support for 
redistribution. 
 
Our results have also relevant implications. On the one hand, they confirm that 
if inequality is harmful for economic growth it is not because redistribution is higher in 
unequal countries -as Alesina and Rodrik, (1994) and Persson and Tabellini, (1994) 
suggested-. In fact, there are a number of alternative theories which explain why 
inequality is bad for economic growth. Bénabou (1996), for example, considers that 
inequality may hamper human capital accumulation and, therefore, economic growth. 
Perotti (1996) suggests that inequality stimulates political violence, which, in turn, 
disincentives investment; and Keefer and Knack (2002) hold that inequality leads to 
political polarization, which causes increasing uncertainty on property rights and 
discourages investment. On the other hand, the results of this paper have also 
implications on the determinants of the political regime. Although it might look 
paradoxical at a first glance, we do not need inequality to have a positive impact on 
redistribution for the economic elites to have incentives to support authoritarian 
governments in order to avoid redistribution. We just need the cost of redistribution 
under dictatorship (plus the cost of maintaining the dictatorship) to be lower than in 
democracy (which is not incompatible with the fact that egalitarian democracies 
redistribute more than non-egalitarian democracies). 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1. Social transfers (as a % of GDP), 1880-1930 
  1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 
       
Argentina  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Australia  0 0 0 1.12 1.66 2.11 
Austria  0 0 0 0 0 1.43 
Belgium  0.17 0.22 0.26 0.43 0.52 0.56 
Brazil  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canada  0 0 0 0 0.06 0.31 
Denmark  0.96 1.11 1.41 1.75 2.71 3.11 
Finland  0.66 0.76 0.78 0.9 0.85 2.97 
France  0.46 0.54 0.57 0.81 0.64 1.05 
Greece  0 0 0 0 0 0.07 
Italy  0 0 0 0 0 0.08 
Japan  0.05 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.21 
Mexico  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands  0.29 0.3 0.39 0.39 0.99 1.03 
New Zeeland 0.17 0.39 1.09 1.35 1.84 2.43 
Norway  1.07 0.95 1.24 1.18 1.09 2.39 
Portugal  0 0.12 0.1 0.09 0.42 0.35 
Spain  0.36 0.43 0.36 0.33 0.27 0.49 
Sweden  0.72 0.85 0.85 1.03 1.14 2.59 
United Kingdom 0.86 0.83 1 1.38 1.39 2.32 
United States  0.29 0.45 0.55 0.56 0.7 0.56 
Sources: Lindert website database. For more details see text. Figures on Portugal come from Valerio (2001) 
and Spanish figures are my own. The estimates fit Lindert’s definitions. In the case of Spain social transfers 
have been estimated from public budget sources and the Spanish Statistical Yearbooks. Portuguese figures 
have been taken from Valerio (2001). Since his estimates only include public administrations’ spending, 
his figures fit with Lindert’s definitions. 
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Table A.2. Social spending (as a % of GDP), 1930 and 1933 
 1930 1933  
    
Australia  5.79 6.17  
Belgium  1.83 5.85  
Bulgaria  0.14 0.17  
Canada  0.68 2.15  
Czechoslovakia  2.91 4.72  
Denmark  4.8 6.32  
Finland  2.11 2.57  
France  2.49 3.97  
Germany  11.15 12.41  
Hungary  1.88 1.61  
Ireland  4.48 5.44  
Italy 1.4 1.4  
Japan  0.67 0.51  
Netherlands  1.61 6.56  
Poland  2.03 2.03  
Portugal  0.35 0.58  
Spain  0.48 1.05  
Sweden  3.84 6.02  
Switzerland  2.18 3.54  
United Kingdom   6.52 7.7  
URSS 1.81 2.55  
Yugoslavia  0.07 0.14   
Sources: see text. 
 
 
 
Table A.3. Top 0.1% income shares, 1880-1930                            
 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 
Argentina       7.52 
Australia      3.97 3.2 
Canada      5.36 5.68 
Finland      5.92 4.74 
France    8 8 7.63 5.79 
Japan  7.22 5.63 6.83 7.75 7.9 7.32 
Netherland    8.63 8.92 6.47 
Norway  7.89 7.71 6.59 8.03 6.19 4.35 
New Zealand     3.13 2.6 
Portugal       5.87 
Sweden    8.66 8.11 5.23 4.82 
United Kingdom     11.24 8.03 7.81 
United States        8.62 5.37 6.4 
Sources: Atkinson et al. (2007) and Guilera (2010) for Portugal. 
Notes: Argentina’s figure for 1930 refers to 1932. Australia’s figure for 1920 refers to 1921. France’s figures 
for 1900 and 1910 refer to 1905. Finland’s figures on top 1% income shares were very similar to those of 
Sweden. Consequently, I have assumed that Finland’s top 0.1% income shares were proportional to those 
of Sweden. Japan’s figure for 1880 refers to 1886. Netherlands’ figure for 1910 refers to 1914. Norway’s 
figure for 1880 refers to 1875, that of 1890 refers to 1888, that of 1900 refers to 1902, that of 1910 refers to 
1906, and that of 1930 refers to 1929. 1920’s figure has been interpolated. New Zealand’s figure for 1920 
refers to 1921. Portugal’s figure for 1930 refers to 1936. Sweden’s figure for 1900 refers to 1903, and that of 
1910 refers to 1911. United Kingdom’s figure for 1910 refers to 1913. US’ figure for 1910 refers to 1913. 
